The Bab el‑Mandeb, the narrowest point of the Red Sea at roughly 20 miles across, could be shut down by a single sunken vessel, a hidden minefield or a missile strike on a tanker. Tehran has now publicly warned that it may take such steps.
Brigadier General Ebrahim Zolfaghari, who serves as the spokesperson for Iran’s Khatam al‑Anbiya Central Headquarters, told state media on Wednesday that continued U.S. naval actions in the Persian Gulf would lead Tehran to treat the Red Sea as a “closed zone” for shipping. No specific timeline or procedural details were offered, but the declaration marks the first overt Iranian suggestion of blocking this vital waterway. The focus of the regional tension has long been the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf through which about one‑fifth of global oil supplies flow.
Iran has previously threatened to disrupt that choke point. By extending its rhetoric to the Bab el‑Mandeb, the country is now targeting the southern gateway to the Red Sea, a corridor that funnels container ships and oil tankers toward the Suez Canal and onward to Europe and the Mediterranean.
Closing the Bab el‑Mandeb would sever a major artery of international commerce. The route carries crude from the Middle East and manufactured goods from Asia to European ports. Any interruption would likely drive up insurance costs, force vessels to detour around the Cape of Good Hope—adding weeks to voyages and incurring millions of dollars in extra expenses—and strain supply chains that have only recently steadied after pandemic‑induced disruptions.
Iran frames its warning as a reaction to what it describes as an “illegal naval siege.” The United States, for its part, labels its expanded naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman a “defensive maritime security operation” aimed at interdicting Iranian weapons shipments and safeguarding commercial vessels. While the Pentagon has not confirmed a formal blockade, Iranian officials continue to use that terminology.
The Khatam al‑Anbiya headquarters, which coordinates joint operations for Iran’s General Staff, issued the statement. It did not elaborate on the means by which Tehran might enforce a closure. Potential tactics could include laying mines—an area in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard has invested heavily—or deploying anti‑ship missiles, capabilities the U.S. Navy has also prepared to counter.
The threat is not merely symbolic. A shutdown would deliver a tangible blow to economies reliant on just‑in‑time delivery and stable energy prices.
Nations such as Egypt, which earns billions in Suez Canal tolls; Saudi Arabia, whose western ports lie on the Red Sea; Israel, whose port of Eilat opens onto the same sea; and European countries dependent on the Suez route for Asian trade now face heightened stakes. Iran’s past behavior suggests that threats can translate into action, though often through indirect or deniable means. In 2019 the country was accused of attacking tankers near Fujairah, and in 2020 it was blamed for a mine strike on an Israeli‑owned vessel in the Gulf of Oman.
A Red Sea closure could follow a similar pattern—sporadic incidents that render the passage too hazardous for commercial traffic without an official blockade declaration. Zolfaghari’s remarks tied the possible Red Sea shutdown directly to the persistence of U.S. naval operations, which Washington says are intended to prevent attacks on merchant shipping and curb Iranian arms transfers.
While the Strait of Hormuz remains the more immediate flashpoint, the prospect of a Red Sea closure expands the strategic calculus for a broader set of regional and global actors.
