Jordan’s political landscape shifted on September 15, 2024, when King Abdullah II accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh and named his chief of staff, Jafar Hassan, as the new head of government. The appointment places a figure with deep military ties at the helm of a civilian administration, signaling a potential recalibration of the kingdom’s priorities.
Hassan’s background sets him apart from typical civilian prime ministers. As the king’s chief of staff, he operated at the nexus of Jordan’s security and defense planning, working directly with the monarch. This role gave him intimate knowledge of the military apparatus and the palace’s strategic objectives.
However, he lacks experience running a ministry or managing a government confronting a severe economic crisis. This inexperience represents a calculated risk.
Khasawneh’s tenure leaves a mixed legacy. On the international stage, Jordan maintained its role as a diplomatic hub, hosting meetings on Syria and Palestine. The kingdom remained a stable partner in a turbulent region, with the United States continuing its flow of economic and military aid. Domestically, however, the picture was less favorable.
High unemployment, a struggling economy, and the ongoing strain of the Syrian refugee crisis—now in its second decade—continued to burden infrastructure and public services. These challenges now fall to Hassan.
The timing of the change is significant. Jordan sits between the war in Gaza, instability in Syria, and broader regional power struggles. The king requires a government capable of managing external threats without losing control of domestic affairs.
Hassan’s security-focused background suggests that defense priorities may take precedence, raising questions about whether economic reform will receive sufficient attention. Western capitals are monitoring the transition closely.
The United States has long viewed Jordan as a reliable partner, and Hassan’s appointment is unlikely to alter that perception. His military credentials make him a known quantity to American and European defense officials, signaling continuity rather than disruption. However, Washington will expect results.
Aid packages come with conditions: progress on economic reform, continued counterterrorism cooperation, and steady regional diplomacy. For ordinary Jordanians, the change at the top may seem distant.
The new prime minister must form a cabinet, a process that takes time. The real test will come when that cabinet presents a budget, a jobs plan, or a response to the next crisis. Khasawneh’s government struggled to deliver on economic promises, and Hassan inherits those same expectations and constraints.
Jordan’s limited natural resources, dependence on foreign aid, and inability to absorb its young population into the labor market are structural problems that no single appointment can solve. What Hassan brings is proximity to the king.
He has the monarch’s trust, which matters in a system where real power resides with the palace. A prime minister who can coordinate with the military and security services without friction is an asset. Yet that closeness also raises questions: Will Hassan have the autonomy to make independent decisions, or will he be seen as executing palace orders rather than setting policy?
The resignation and appointment occurred swiftly, suggesting the king wanted a clean break rather than a prolonged transition. The decision had likely been in preparation; Hassan was already within the palace structure.
The coming weeks will reveal the direction: cabinet formation, a policy statement, and early signals on economic priorities. The new government will be expected to build on Jordan’s diplomatic role while addressing the domestic challenges that undermined its predecessor. That is a formidable task, but for now, the king has made his choice. Jafar Hassan is in charge, and the consequences will unfold from there.
