On 16 September 2023 the ruling military councils of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signed a tripartite defense agreement known as the Alliance of Sahel States. The pact obliges each signatory to come to the aid of the others if they are attacked, a commitment that was prompted by the threat of intervention from the West African regional bloc ECOWAS. The alliance emerged directly from the 2023 crisis in Niger, where soldiers overthrew the elected administration.
ECOWAS responded with warnings that it would use force to restore civilian rule, although no invasion materialised. The prospect of external military action pushed the three juntas—already isolated after their own coups—into closer cooperation.
Mali’s military takeover occurred in 2021, Burkina Faso’s in September 2022 and Niger’s in 2023. All three states have been suspended from ECOWAS and share borders, as well as a common security challenge: jihadist insurgencies linked to al‑Qaida and the Islamic State that have plagued the Sahel for years, causing thousands of deaths and displacing millions. Beyond the immediate defensive promise, the agreement reflects deeper strategic calculations.
Each junta faces ongoing internal security problems that it cannot fully manage alone, and all have strained relations with former colonial power France, which has withdrawn its troops from Mali and Burkina Faso. By pooling troops, intelligence and equipment, the three governments hope to strengthen their fight against insurgents while presenting a united front against any external pressure.
The concept of a regional security coalition is not new to the Sahel. The G5 Sahel, a French‑backed force that once included Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, collapsed after Mali exited in 2022. The new Alliance of Sahel States differs in that it excludes any Western partner, forming a purely African, military‑only bloc among governments that rule by decree.
Long‑term ambitions extend beyond battlefield cooperation. The three juntas have voiced intentions to coordinate economic and diplomatic policies, including discussions about a shared currency or a common economic space that would further distance them from ECOWAS structures.
They also aim to develop a joint security architecture capable of withstanding future crises. Whether these broader goals will materialise depends on the durability of the juntas’ cooperation. Rivalries and personal ambitions have historically undermined African alliances, and internal power struggles could test the pact’s resilience.
Nevertheless, the agreement offers immediate benefits: it serves as a deterrent against foreign intervention and provides each regime with a narrative of sovereignty and strength for domestic audiences. Other Sahelian nations have watched the development with cautious interest.
Chad, which has not experienced a recent coup, and Mauritania have so far stayed out of the alliance, leaving the pact as a three‑member club. Its ultimate success will be judged not by the document signed in September but by how the member states respond to future challenges—whether a renewed jihadist offensive, renewed ECOWAS sanctions, or internal political turmoil.
