Sudan’s latest war is not new. It is the same old fight wearing a different uniform.
The country has suffered 20 coup attempts since independence in 1956. Two civil wars. The Darfur genocide. Prolonged military rule. Now, the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan are fighting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces under General Hemedti. The RSF leader also commands the broader Janjaweed coalition — the same Arab militias that carried out the Darfur genocide two decades ago.
That continuity matters. The current conflict began on April 15, 2023, when RSF units attacked government sites in Khartoum and other cities. The Battle of Khartoum followed. But the trigger — a dispute over integrating the RSF into the regular army after the 2021 coup — is just the latest flashpoint in a long pattern. Sudan’s transitional administration, set up after the 2021 coup, was supposed to hold the country together. Instead, it became a stage for a power struggle between two men and their armed followers.
Hemedti built the RSF into a significant force. His men are battle-hardened. They have their own interests. Their integration into the Sudanese Army was always going to be a point of contention. When negotiations broke down, the RSF struck first.
The fighting has since spread beyond Khartoum. Smaller armed groups have joined in. Each has its own agenda. The result is a battlefield with multiple fronts and no clear endgame.
This is not a civil war in the sense of a popular uprising or a clear ideological divide. It is a war between two factions of the same military government. Both sides were partners in the 2021 coup that derailed Sudan’s transition to civilian rule. Now they are shooting at each other over who gets to run the country.
The human cost is mounting. The humanitarian crisis in the region was already severe before April 15. It is getting worse. The conflict has the potential to destabilize neighboring countries. Refugees are fleeing. Food and medicine are running short.
But the deeper story is one of repetition. Sudan has been here before. The names change. The uniforms change. The underlying instability does not. Twenty coup attempts over six decades. Two civil wars. A genocide. Now this.
The Darfur genocide was carried out by the Janjaweed. Hemedti commands the Janjaweed coalition today. That same force is now fighting for control of the capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces, which stood by or participated in that genocide, are now fighting the Janjaweed. It is a bitter irony that no one in Khartoum has time to dwell on.
The smaller armed groups add complexity. They are not neutral. They have their own grievances and their own ambitions. Some are former rebels from the peace process. Some are local militias. Their participation means this war could fragment further.
The transitional administration was supposed to prevent this. It failed. The 2021 coup was supposed to bring order. It brought more fighting. The integration of the RSF was supposed to unify the military. It started a war.
Sudan’s chronic instability is not a background detail. It is the story. Every new conflict is a variation on an old theme. The players shift. The tactics shift. The pattern holds. The country has never managed to build lasting peace since independence. This war is the latest proof of that failure.
